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Students in Search of Meaning; 
or Why Literacy Alone Is Not Enough 
Laurel Thompson 
The New Austerity 
Beginning in many kindergartens these days, school is almost exclusively about 
reading and writing. It is about learning how to decode symbols and manipulate 
them so that you can digest other peoples’ writing and express your thoughts. In 
the new Elementary Literacy Block introduced in the fall of 2002 at Denver Pub-
lic Schools, half-day kindergarten students spend three and a half hours in 
school, three hours of which is devoted to literacy. Children trace and play with 
letters or numbers, look at big books, listen to stories on tape, do alphabet or 
number puzzles, write letters or words (author’s personal observation). Students 
in subsequent grades face a similar routine designed to have them reading one 
million words a year. Classroom teachers work on “expectations” for annual as-
sessments mandated by the Colorado Basic Literacy Act (CBLA) and the dis-
trict’s Literacy Program, devoting three hours a day (almost four for Spanish-
speaking students) to reading and writing workshops, skills, and other literacy 
development activities. Teachers of other subjects like music, art, or P.E. are re-
quired to have a strong literacy component in their lessons so that students lose 
no opportunity to pick up content vocabulary or to perceive the symbolic con-
nections between “specials” and reading and writing. Other than lunch and one 
recess, there is no part of the day that is free from a subtle, well-meant pressure 
to shift children into print. 
It takes several years before children are completely under the alphabet’s 
spell, and primary teachers must provide a variety of materials to hold the inter-
est of the younger ones. However, by about grade three or four all the hands-on 
activities usually stop because it is assumed the children are hooked. They have 
learned enough about the alphabet, decoding and grammar to enter the “House 
of Print” and can now be subjected fully to the linguistic way of understanding 
the world. Though they may forget about the code after three-thirty, play soccer, 
and not touch another book for the rest of the day, when they open those pages 
again at nine o’clock the next morning their brains know exactly what to do be-
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cause they have been trained. They have been trained to decipher printed lin-
guistic representations. This training, no matter how devoutly it is to be wished 
and no matter how many doors it opens, is also the closing, or at least the re-
modeling of some other doors, the doors of perception. I wonder if teachers real-
ize how significant this is. 
The purpose of this article is to raise questions about the current almost 
exclusive emphasis on literacy and math in many of our public schools and to re-
start a discussion about the relation between language and perception in learn-
ing. Dewey wrote about this relationship in How We Think (first published in 
1910) when he observed that Pestalozzi’s “object teaching” (a pedagogy that 
tried to substitute sense perception of things for the manipulation of symbols, 
introduced by way of England at the beginning of the nineteenth century but not 
popular in American schools until the 1850s) was a necessary corrective to “the 
abuse of linguistic methods in education,” and “the preeminence assigned to lan-
guage in schools” (1933, 236–37). Education reformers were right, he thought, to 
attack teacher verbalism—the premium put on technical facility and skill in pro-
ducing external results—because words separated from things lacked “intelligi-
ble signification” (236). If the job of educators was to transform language into a 
“conscious tool for conveying knowledge and assisting thought” (239), they 
could not do this if they talked all the time, if lessons were too short and “so mi-
nutely subdivided as to break up the unity of the meaning,” and focused on 
avoiding error not attaining power. This failure happened, he argued, because 
the educational value of “observation” was not appreciated. An emphasis “upon 
the linguistic factor eliminated all opportunities for first-hand acquaintance with 
real things” (248), which was necessary to enlarge children’s vocabulary, to ren-
der their use of words more precise, and to form habits of consecutive discourse 
(240–46). 
For Dewey, the exclusively linguistic method reduced individuals to “para-
sites” living on “the secondhand experience of others” (237). My concern is 
similar but slightly different. Since the beginning of the last century, our lives 
have become much more mediated and commercialized, and it is difficult to find 
an area that has not been touched by images, slogans, journalism, movies, and 
books. Children are assaulted by ads as soon as they can sit up, and everywhere 
they go in a crowded world, the voices of strangers are urging them to see this, 
buy that, and get on track and attain a college education so that they earn 
enough money to shop. Free exploration of the planet they will one day inherit 
and idle curiosity to investigate the many things they will have to know how to 
use are luxuries of the past when from day one they are pushed onto a conveyor 
belt whose end is future production and income.  
How, then, are they supposed to make sense of their lives? Unless they are 
given help early on in learning how to distinguish the real from the unreal, the 
truth from propaganda, fact from opinion, they will be pawns for whatever 
brand name is fashionable, whatever trend is “cool,” whatever slogan is repeated 
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often enough, and the actual circumstances or power brokering behind the 
flashy products they are enjoined to purchase will escape them. We live in a 
much more artificial world than Dewey did, and it requires considerable sophis-
tication to deduce the implications of the various campaigns that vie for our at-
tention. In addition to learning how to write “power paragraphs,” children need 
to become savvy about the structure of the reality they are moving into so that 
they learn ways to survive the onslaught they will experience and to confront its 
basic assumptions.  
This “structure” is based on symbolic thought, whose abstracting process 
helps us organize the details of reality so that they better suit our species, and 
language is the symbolic system we use for thinking and communicating. It 
shows us how to get the most out of what exists by dividing entities from their 
behavior and designing itineraries through the world. How language creates 
worldviews for us that then influence and determine how we perceive other peo-
ple, places, problems, and things is one of the most important realizations a 
thinking person can make. It is the discovery that humans live, in fact, in two 
worlds—the world of events and things, and the world of words about events and 
things; and the sooner we become conscious of the abstracting process at the 
heart of language, the sooner we realize that this process distorts reality by sim-
plifying it. In addition, it takes place at a considerable remove from the reality of 
the world itself and it is very human-centered (Postman, 1996, 181). 
My first objective, therefore, is to make mainstream teachers more aware 
of the system of thought they are imposing on children when they teach them 
how to read and use written materials, and a brief review of recent research on 
language is in order. I would also like to alert teachers to what they are ignoring 
or leaving out by not including experiential activities in their lesson plans. Lan-
guage hooks onto reality through perception and gets its meaning by referring to 
experiences that have happened or are happening to people, and to things that 
are “out there” (Putnam, 1994a, 456). “Words can detach and preserve a mean-
ing only when the meaning has been first involved in our own direct intercourse 
with things” (Dewey, 1933, 176). “Understanding cannot exist without contact,” 
wrote Paul Feyerabend in The Conquest of Abundance. “Contact changes the par-
ties concerned” (Feyerabend, 1999, 268). If sensory connection with a wide range 
of phenomena is essential for creating meaning and developing understanding, 
should not at least a part of the school curriculum be devoted to giving students 
experiences out of which they learn important facts about themselves and the 
world? Why, then, are we shunting children into classrooms all day long and 
confining their attention to books? 
An exclusive focus on print could be construed as a form of sensory depri-
vation. It could also be charged with responsibility for subjecting students to 
propaganda. How so? When educators are obliged to behave as if reading is 
enough, when they are not encouraged to take students out of the classroom or 
bring things into it that can be seen, smelled, touched, or heard, they unhinge 
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language from its already tenuous relationship with reality and make the world 
irrelevant to its working. This cuts students off from the physical reality they 
need to be able to refer to in order to check the truth of statements. It also risks 
not valuing the contact with things through their senses children need to develop 
common sense about the world. Language is an extremely powerful representa-
tional system that is capable of controlling our whole consciousness if we are not 
careful. Given the extent to which we are now dependent on it, is it not essential 
that we not let it obscure our connection with the world? 
Language as a Conspiracy against Experience 
If teachers are not yet conscious of what they do to children’s perception when 
they teach reading and writing exclusively, it may be that the current concern 
with raising test scores does not allow them the time or opportunity to investi-
gate the subtler effects of an exclusive focus on print. Few classroom teachers en-
gage in research, and in the climate created by President Bush’s No Child Left 
Behind legislation, it is unlikely that anyone could justify spending time or 
money investigating the negative consequences of teaching people to read. Be-
sides, what children perceive is determined by many factors other than school; it 
has been realized for a long time that educators struggle to achieve their goals 
against the overwhelming influence of socioeconomic factors, home life, televi-
sion, popular music, films, which can all be much more powerful forces in a 
child’s life than the classroom. In the context of influences on what a child per-
ceives, does it even make sense to try to isolate reading and writing from all the 
other forces that impact a child’s apprehension? 
Cultural influences, however, are not the same as mental shifts, and the 
linkage between seeing and hearing that occurs when children learn to use the 
phonetic alphabet is different in kind from the changes that occur when some-
one embraces a new way of talking or dressing or experiences a change in eco-
nomic circumstances. In learning to read we shift our attention from the beauti-
ful world that surrounds us to row after row of black abstract ciphers. We break 
“the spontaneous participation of our eyes and ears in the surrounding terrain 
(where they had ceaselessly converged in the synaesthetic encounter with ani-
mals, plants and streams) in order to recouple those senses upon the flat surface 
of the page” (Abram, 1996, 131). This displacement is not just a different version 
of a familiar theme. It opens the door to another reality, a mental reality as op-
posed to the sensory reality in which everyone lives, and once children have been 
taught to find it, for the rest of their lives they will jostle back and forth schizo-
phrenically between one or the other, letting the two mix together and blend un-
til they are difficult to separate. 
It would be hard to exaggerate what a difference this makes in a person’s 
consciousness. Suddenly, a huge chunk of human history, imagination, and 
thought is available to be absorbed, reflected upon, and continued. While teach-
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ers can only introduce it to students gradually (and some only stay long enough 
to feel a small fraction of its power), they are nevertheless putting a spell on 
them, a spell from which most of them will probably never awaken. Hidden 
within a magical code, it is the key to human culture, but it is also a conspiracy 
against immediate experience whose negative effects have still not been fully in-
vestigated. 
Nor is it as well known as it ought to be that sense perception is a form of 
knowledge in its own right and that by using it we learn many things that cannot 
be processed linguistically (Code, 1993, 32). Perception is our bodily encounter 
with the world around us, and if we value that world, should we not also value 
the equipment that allows us to apprehend it? 
Easier said than done, you may say. When standards and high-stakes tests 
are the key determinants on a school curriculum and pedagogy, the only kinds of 
teaching allowed are those that permit numerical assessment, e.g., test scores, es-
say grades, etc. Since perception is subjective, there is no way to objectively 
measure progress in achieving greater complexity, subtlety, or depth. To make 
expanding students’ consciousness part of the school day, educators would either 
have to relax accountability standards or else adopt new rubrics that value emo-
tional and moral development, the ability to sense more about objects, people, 
and places, the capacity to represent ideas artistically and practically. Most im-
poverished schools cannot do this because it flies in the face of all the literacy 
training their faculty have received over the past few years. When governments 
are starved for funding, schools under fire have limited room in which to ma-
neuver. The prospects for a less skill-oriented, more humanistic curriculum are 
not encouraging. 
These are the practical arguments against making school a more percep-
tual experience for students, but there is another reason why schools under fire 
may be hesitant to criticize literacy and embrace more experiential learning. 
Long before de Saussure surveyed the path of modern linguistics, William James 
knew that language is a representational system that presupposes perception. 
“To know what the concept ‘color’ means you must have seen red or blue, or 
green” (James, 1977b, 245). He also knew that to function well, language re-
quires the analysis and fixing of concepts upon a relational scheme with respect 
to other concepts and that this exercise takes you further and further away from 
“concrete bits of sensible experience” (James, 1977a, 243). It takes you back into 
language, to teasing out the differences between words and finding better ways to 
express what you want to say. There is a hidden reason why most school reform-
ers are not insisting that children have experiential activities to build up their 
background knowledge and help them grasp the concepts we want them to learn. 
It is that the work of using language is so absorbing it takes over the whole of 
consciousness and makes us forget about what is in front of us. “Whenever we 
conceive a thing we define it; and if we still don’t understand, we define our defi-
nition. This habit of defining is inveterate. The farther we push it, the more we 
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learn about our subject of discourse, and the less we remember the actual experi-
ence until we end by thinking that knowing the latter consists of getting farther 
and farther away from the perceptual type of experience” (James, 1977b, 247). 
This abstracting tendency is the curse of using symbols and is not peculiar 
to spoken or written languages. “Any language,” writes Michael Baxandall, “is a 
conspiracy against experience in the sense of a collective attempt to simplify and 
arrange experience into manageable parcels” (Baxandall, as quoted by Feyer-
abend, 1999, 27--28). We use symbols to structure our lives, shape them to our 
needs, and get control over them, and all forms of symbolic activity—maps, mu-
sic, painting, dance, mathematics—press us to ignore life and conform to their 
patterns and institutions (Feyerabend, 1999, 29). 
However, language’s grip on human consciousness is particularly tight and 
deep, and as David Abram has shown, print is actually bewitching. A strong vis-
ual bias runs through Western thought that has its origins in language’s capacity 
to generate schema or linguistic representations that supposedly “mirror” reality. 
Until fairly recently, the chief task of Western philosophy was the search for ob-
jective knowledge, by which I mean truth that is independent of bias and which 
can be verified. How do you verify propositions? You look to see if what they 
maintain is corroborated by the facts. If they do not hold up under close inspec-
tion, then you throw the propositions out. However, if they do hold up, then you 
have uncovered something that can be considered “true.” 
This method of verifying propositions by checking to see whether they 
“mirror” reality goes back through Kant and Descartes to the Greeks but has re-
cently been subjected to criticism. Something is “true” if it corresponds to real-
ity, but since “reality” is filtered through whatever conceptual system you are us-
ing to uncover the truth, something is true if it corresponds to your conceptual 
schema. Can you not pry open your categories to admit comparison with the 
things they are supposed to be representing, the situation they are supposed to 
be changing, the problems they are supposed to be addressing? No. Once you 
have employed concepts to organize your experience (which is to say, once you 
have started to think), there is no going back to seeing the world without them 
because that would be like returning to a prereflective, infantile stage where your 
observations would mean nothing. Only if there were some way to exit language 
altogether could you perceive the world without the categories that have been es-
tablished to understand and control its contents, and so far no one has figured 
out how to do this. Given the conviction, in any case, that adult human percep-
tion is heavily concept-laden, such a technique would likely be met with great 
skepticism. Language’s control over human thought is so thorough we cannot 
even taste the tart purity of wild blueberries without engendering ideas about 
“wildness,” “fruit,” “survival,” or “scarcity.”  
A faster, more efficient eradicator of raw experience would be hard to con-
ceive. Language consumes life as if it were a cloth wiping a table clean. Where 
does the raw experience go? It becomes material for reflection, plans, projects, 
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products, itineraries. Since language helps us do the things we want to do, we 
have a tendency to focus on that—what we want to do—not the tool we are using 
to help us do it or what we are doing things to. The grammar of everyday lan-
guage is shaped by pragmatic concerns: how to pay your bills, where to buy or-
ganic food, which candidate to vote for, and neither consciousness of how lan-
guage works nor “faithfulness to the full multiplicity of experiential phenomena” 
is economically valuable enough to figure much in our concerns (Stern, 1995, 12).  
What about poetry? Nature writing? Phenomenology? Are these not at-
tempts to use words carefully and directly present the contents of immediate ex-
perience? Yes, they are, but as Wittgenstein realized to his dismay, even these 
more phenomenological uses of language are subject to the same limits that pre-
vent everyday language from representing what we perceive—they are represen-
tations—and therefore contain a hypothetical element (the world as idea) that 
directly contradicts the physical nature of immediate reality (ibid., 144). Lan-
guage and perception belong to two self-contained worlds, the mental and the 
physical, and the two only connect when what we say is made true by what we 
see—verified by observation. For obvious reasons, connection is desirable, but it 
is rarer than one might think. This is because there is something in language it-
self that pushes users to sever their ties with biological reality so that they can 
move freely in a separate, totally intellectual world. 
Review of Research on Language and Perception 
During the past thirty years, a new way of understanding intelligence has devel-
oped that uses the computer as a model of the human mind. Known as the com-
putational theory of mind, it claims that intelligence comes from information; 
that is, it is the correlation of two things produced by a lawful process (as op-
posed to coming about by sheer chance)—and is found wherever causes have ef-
fects. What makes information special is that it can be processed; it can be sym-
bolized and made to do things. This dexterity forms the basis of thinking 
machines. “To the extent that thought consists of applying any set of well-
specified rules, a machine can be built that, in some sense, thinks. To the extent 
that the world obeys mathematical equations that can be solved step by step, a 
machine can be built that simulates the world and makes predictions about it. 
To the extent that rational thought corresponds to the rules of logic, a machine 
can be built that carries out rational thought. To the extent that a language can 
be captured by a set of grammatical rules, a machine can be built that produces 
grammatical sentences” (Pinker, 1997, 67–68). 
This machine-oriented theory has been strikingly helpful for understand-
ing how language works. Just like a machine, our brains construct a model of the 
world and crank out formal syntactic patterns day in and day out without our 
ever giving it a thought (Bickerton, 1995, 39). “Each person’s brain contains a 
lexicon of words and the concepts they stand for (a mental dictionary) and a set 
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of rules that combine the words to convey relationships among concepts (a men-
tal grammar) (Pinker, 2000, 76). Indeed, a few elements and a few rules can pro-
duce so many combinations that the computer is capable of generating only a 
fraction of their range. The process of computation also explains how many pre-
viously inscrutable mental phenomena developed, such as beliefs (beliefs are in-
scriptions in memory) desires (desires are goal inscriptions), thinking (thinking 
is computation), perception (perceptions are inscriptions triggered by sensors), 
and trying (trying is executing operations triggered by a goal) (Pinker, 1997, 78). 
In fact, the whole mystery of thinking and talking has been reconstituted in the 
light of the computer as the distillation of syntactic patterns under the direction 
of a Universal Grammar. 
If language is easier to understand because of the computer, it also be-
comes easier to see that just like a computer, language has a program, a series of 
coded instructions for thinking. The program is designed for our survival as a 
species. By separating entities from their behavior, it focuses on how things func-
tion—how animals behave and phenomena occur. By providing only a certain 
number of grammatical units, it limits what we say about the world to those as-
pects which are useful or practical. The program supports representation at any 
cost. We have just to perceive something to form an idea about it, which is then 
connected to other ideas or concepts on the huge map of reality we carry around 
in our heads. Finally, syntax helps us form sentences automatically, and these 
sentences are basically itineraries into and through the world. Our actions are ef-
fective to the extent that we plan what to do by first rehearsing it in our minds.  
It is a little like driving a car. We negotiate reality with language, whose 
program guides us through the world and shows us how things work. From the 
moment we become aware that there is a reality outside ourselves, we start build-
ing a model of the way things are. First it is purely perceptual—our mother’s 
face, her hands, her voice. Then, as we learn the names for things, people, and 
places, it becomes linguistic. Depending on what our genes give us, we have our 
own needs and wants and look for ways to satisfy them in the reality we have 
been dealt; however, we always have to settle for what there is. This is why it is a 
negotiation. We try to negotiate the best reality we can from the circumstances 
into which we were born and the categories language gives us (Bickerton, 1991, 
248–49).  
Where do the categories come from? We do not know. They seem to be 
innate. Chomsky thinks we have a language faculty: “There is, it seems rather 
clear, a rich conceptual structure determined by the initial state of the language 
faculty (perhaps drawing from the resources of other genetically determined fac-
ulties of mind), waiting to be awakened by experience” (Chomsky, 2000, 64). 
While we may not be as aware as other species are of those aspects of the world 
our type of consciousness does not pick up on, linguistic consciousness has 
granted us the ability to conceive practically anything. We have just to perceive 
something to form an idea about it. Long before we could actually perceive dis-
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tant planets, we conceived the idea of the universe. Language is an innate 
mechanism to learn with whose chief features—concepts and syntax—have al-
lowed us to create models of whatever we pay attention to and do. 
What about perception? Perception is our other form of knowledge. Its 
field is the amazing world that surrounds us, into which we venture every day 
that we are alive. However, the explanation for how something crosses over from 
being outside us to inside our consciousness is not nearly as convincing as the 
one that explains how language works. This is partly because perception really is 
mysterious. We still do not understand how we sense things and know their 
meaning and value. Nor is it clear why perceptions vary from culture to culture. 
What we see seems to depend on an interior construction of our own (Zajonc, 
1993, 5). Nor does our perception concur with what the world is like according 
to scientists. The world that physicists describe as being full of energy and mo-
tion is quite unlike the steady one that we perceive (Bolles, 1991, x–xxiii).  
We are also befuddled because Descartes saddled us with a totally unneces-
sary “interface” conception that internalizes perception—i.e., the immediate ob-
jects of perception are mental not physical—and leaves their objective reference 
almost wholly undetermined (Putnam, 1994a, 452). In order to explain how he 
knew that his stove was hot, Descartes invented the notion of “sense data” to ac-
count for the transfer of heat from the stove to his skin to his brain. He refused 
to believe that his senses were capable of picking up this sensation on their own 
but rather needed a sort of intermediary to convey the “information.” This idea 
evolved over the centuries to include numerous refinements until now there is a 
whole school of cognitivists, or brain-based researchers, who study perception as 
a form of information processing (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1981). They argue that if 
language processes experience so that it can be represented conceptually, percep-
tion processes neural responses so that they can be turned into experience.  
Not everyone thinks that we need “sense data” to account for what hap-
pens when we look at a pear or the back of a truck or a mountain in the Himala-
yas. William P. Alston thinks that “there is a cognitive element, aspect, or com-
ponent of perception that is nonconceptual” (Alston, 1998, 2). Merleau-Ponty 
argued that perception is embodied (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). James J. Gibson de-
veloped a fascinating vocabulary to describe the environment that all animals 
perceive (Gibson, 1986, 8–9). His student Edward S. Reed has written a powerful 
defense of sense perception, The Necessity of Experience, that says that not only is 
it primary, but also that our lives are now so mediated by culture that some of us 
do not get enough physical experience to think clearly (Reed, 1997). Conscious-
ness for these thinkers is not just something that goes on in our heads but is ex-
perienced in and through our bodies in an environment whose features con-
stantly influence how we achieve homeostasis. “No animal could exist without 
an environment surrounding it” (Gibson, 1986, 8). Whatever else may be hap-
pening simultaneously in our brains, animals are perceivers because survival de-
pends upon picking up information about temperature, food, water, hazards, 
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and predators. Cognition is not just a brain mechanism; it is a life process. 
Knowing cannot be separated from living, some of which is solitary but most of 
which is collective (Reed, 1996, 168).  
By holding on to perception as a primary, bodily encounter with a multi-
faceted world, these thinkers challenge the notion that it is just the internal in-
formation-processing behavior of single individuals. They are open to ambiguity 
because they redefine consciousness as the awareness of imminent possibilities as 
well as existing things and they allow for more continuity between us and other 
species than has ever before been admitted. Their vision of human awareness 
puts us into a relationship with other animals, landscapes, things, the past and 
the future—the universe. 
Despite its obvious inferiority, Descartes’s narrower definition of human 
consciousness still holds sway in many places. A. J. Ayer argued that what one 
perceives when one perceives an object is a sensory experience which represents 
the object, not the object itself (Ayer, 1973). Distrust of the senses is rampant 
among cognitivists. The belief that we can perceive things directly without taking 
sense data into account is condescendingly known as “naive realism,” and Gib-
son’s “ecological approach” has been dismissed for failing to identify which or-
gans are part of a perceptual “system” (Fodor and Pylyshyn, 1981, 152). Post-
modernist Richard Rorty does not even consider perception worth talking about 
because for him the mental and physical worlds are incommensurable, so the 
idea of being able to produce accurate propositions about reality must be re-
placed by a relativist tolerance for a variety of different interpretations (Rorty, 
1979, 378).  
As a rule, philosophers do not talk about direct perception of the external 
world. Perhaps knowledge through the senses is problematical for them because 
they have not yet relinquished the notion that perception is having your subjec-
tivity affected by things through an interface. How can they even talk about “the 
external world” if they do not believe it is possible to be in genuine cognitive 
contact with it (Putnam, 1994a, 456)? If all languages are a conspiracy against 
experience, then no matter how careful you are, your perception will always be 
laced with cognition; therefore, you will never know whether what you pick up is 
something new or something you already knew. Does this mean that philoso-
phers are forever hindered from writing propositions about the whatness of the 
world around us? It would seem so. How can you write a proposition about 
something you are not entirely sure is there? Even if you are sure that something 
is there, if perception cannot be distinguished from conception, how do you 
write propositions about it that are true? This is the dilemma Samuel Johnson 
resolved by kicking a stone with his foot. 
Alston offers a practical solution when he argues that we should not limit 
knowledge or justified belief to what is supported by propositional reasons, be-
cause, though vulnerable to influence, “how things appear is a reasonably reli-
able though not infallible guide to how they are” (Alston, 1998, 4). His “theory 
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of appearing” may solve the immediate problem of finding a way to restore per-
ception to human consciousness, and David Abram’s “depth ecology” tries to 
rescue our animal bodies from the detachment enforced upon us by using print 
(Abram, 2002). However, unless someone makes a new revelation about our 
cognitive situation that shakes us out of the spell that language puts over us, it 
will be some time before their efforts affect the wider culture—because the real 
problem is that language’s stranglehold over our brains forces us to ignore large 
areas of life that cannot be represented linguistically. As I said earlier, only a few 
investigators have been brave enough to challenge the consensus that what we 
perceive every day when we open our eyes, ears, and noses is off-limits. 
The Consequences of Neglecting Perception 
It would be difficult to overestimate how great a loss this neglect has been. 
Though there is no reason to think that educators are more concerned about the 
loss of perception as a field of academic study than other professionals, silence 
about the faculty that puts us in touch with the external world has affected edu-
cation, too. D. W. Jardine finds “Descartes’ nightmare” in the “attempt to repro-
duce the lives of children, the life of the classroom, the curriculum vitae, into 
clear and presentable objects borne out of a severance from life as it is actually 
lived” (Jardine, 1998). Even though research shows that children deprived of 
sensory engagement with the world have undeveloped abilities to note relation-
ships, to predict, to act, and even to conceive abstract notions, many “back to 
basics” schools still offer science and mathematics from a textbook with little 
opportunity for hands-on learning (Davis et al., 2000, 3–26; Arnheim, 1993). 
When life is divided into subjects, it becomes easier to see that some areas get 
more attention than others. An emphasis on formal concepts and symbol use 
usually follows when standardized tests are the basis for the curriculum, and as I 
said earlier, in many schools a “new austerity” has replaced the curriculum rich-
ness that only a few years ago struggled to be born. By limiting attention to texts, 
teachers can control unhappy students’ behavior better than they ever could be-
fore, because the latter are not responding to things that might invite them to act 
“out of line.” If children must internalize an array of external, ostensibly objec-
tive knowledge—something on the outside must get on the inside—what better 
way to ensure that their concepts match the prescribed understanding of exter-
nal reality than to freeze those concepts in texts and insist that children study 
them? The use of literacy for the social control of poor minorities bears serious 
investigation. 
Holistic educators blame advocates of high-stakes testing for the failure to 
design schools that nurture “whole human beings who can think and act and 
feel” (Miller and Nakagawa, 2002, v). However, it may be that it is the literary 
nature of the mainstream curriculum that prevents teachers from teaching as  
if learning is a “vital, bodily form of participation oriented toward the world”  
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(B. Hocking, 2001, 302). The emphasis on representational systems blinds and 
deafens teachers (and their students) to the rich sensations and emotions that 
come from encountering actual things and places. It takes the smell out of fried 
onions, the rasp out of sawing wood, the pleasure out of observing the life be-
neath a log. It disembodies students because it teaches them to avert their atten-
tion from the gorgeous things all around them and focuses it on rows and rows 
of black, abstract ciphers. Their sensory awareness moves into a mode of semi-
consciousness or even unconsciousness as they lose sight of, or touch with, the 
actual things around them, “the dimension of the sensuous” (H. Bai, 2001, 88–
91). This is not a new development, but it is new, perhaps, to become more 
aware of it. As Abram writes in The Spell of the Sensuous, with the advent of the 
phonetic alphabet, “a new distance” opened between human culture and the rest 
of nature. “The written character no longer refers to any sensible phenomenon 
out in the world, or even to the name of such a phenomenon (as with the rebus), 
but solely to a gesture made by the human mouth” (Abram, 1996, 100). 
The elevation of printed language to the position of being the only form of 
knowledge educators honor and trust has put severe limits on what we think is 
educational. There is no reason why everything in school has to be written down 
or read. Teachers at Rocky Mountain Expeditionary Learning School in Denver 
use a writing-intensive curriculum but they also do things with their students, 
such as study trees for six weeks or make daily visits to a house under construc-
tion or help homeless people connect with resources. These activities involve all 
the features that Dewey thought gave observation its central position in mental 
training. They are open-ended. They incorporate active exploration, and they 
can be approached scientifically (Dewey, 1933, 252–55). 
First-hand experience is also valuable and not unmanageable, even in a 
confined space. Object lessons can be easily handled in a classroom (Eder, 1998; 
Hennigar-Shuh, 1982). Keeping animals in the room has been shown to be re-
markably beneficial for children’ social and emotional development (Rud and 
Beck, 2000). Admittedly, there are reasons why frequent field trips might not be 
integral parts of a school’s curriculum, for example, cost, transportation, and 
fear of misbehavior (Nespor, 2000, 30). However, these problems can be over-
come under supportive circumstances. What about the standards for education 
developed by the National Science Foundation, the National Council on Social 
Studies, and the National Association for the Education of Young Children? Are 
they not evidence that the goal of mainstream education is not just to teach read-
ing and mathematics skills? Yes, and if the teachers actually get to use them, and 
do hands-on activities, not written problems, they give their students a more 
balanced outlook. Most teachers in low-income schools are under pressure to 
pare the curriculum down to test preparation skills and thus do not get the 
chance to imagine, let alone implement, active learning experiences for their stu-
dents. In the current politics of schooling, low-income children lose out twice: 
once when they attend schools that are inadequately funded; and second when 
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they have to learn from a curriculum that has been deliberately narrowed to ad-
dress their test-taking needs. 
We do not yet seem to understand the importance of insisting that chil-
dren use their senses: “Our educational tradition separates perceiving and think-
ing as though they were two entirely different activities” (Arnheim, 1993, 95). 
This is dangerous on several grounds. First, when we do not ask children to keep 
track of their perceptions, we deny them the opportunity to ask questions based 
on what they perceive, and this stifles curiosity. Maxine Greene’s “individual in 
quest of his own future” is relevant here (Greene, 1998, 299). Knowing math and 
science “deeply,” she believed, is not as important as knowing who we are as in-
dividuals and as members of a culture. To create meaning, students need to stay 
in contact with their own observations about the world so that they can rework 
the curriculum they have been taught in terms of their own consciousness. 
Teachers need to bring themselves to school, too, and use their own lives, knowl-
edge, and explorations as part of the curriculum. 
Secondly, to go back to our original analysis of language, if in the class-
room children have to be able to write down or say something to convince us 
that they are learning, we restrict their attention to the map of their concepts of 
the world and exclude the world itself. Insisting that children learn their way 
around the map is not a mistaken goal in itself. We all have to learn what to call 
things, how to describe events so that others understand us, and how to analyze 
situations so that we see how they developed. No one would want to deprive 
children of the chance to learn how to express themselves in words. However, 
what about how the map hooks on to the world? Children also need to spend 
time learning how to observe carefully so that they do not allow their feelings to 
interfere with what they see. They need to learn how to distinguish between what 
is actually happening and what they think is happening or what someone else 
tells them is happening. They need to see the difference between what things 
look like when they are thinking about one thing rather than another. Most im-
portantly, they need to appreciate that there is something amazing “out there” 
that they can investigate if they want to know more of the truth. 
Language without perception is like a plant shorn of its roots, its lifeline to 
the soil. “To know what the concept ‘color’ means you must have seen red or 
blue, or green.” Words need a reference to be meaningful, and by ignoring the 
world as a phenomenon and concentrating only on the linguistic representation 
of it, teachers withdraw the very things children need to make sense not just of 
what they read but of life itself. 
Literacy as a Bully 
Thus, while primary teachers teach children their letters, elementary teachers in-
troduce them to chapter books, and middle school teachers try to get students to 
read more on their own, it may be that the current huge emphasis on literacy, 
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especially in low-achieving schools, is not as enlightened as we thought it was. 
Despite its necessity and the many avenues it opens up for children, when taught 
without corresponding perceptual opportunities, an exclusive focus on literacy 
robs children of the basis they need to create meaning. An exclusive emphasis on 
literacy hides the concrete stuff they need to make “connections” (Stanton, 
2001). If children are not led to honor perception as a form of knowledge as well 
as language, they will not value the world as a field of inquiry and experience and 
beauty. Nor will they develop the basis for making their own words an accurate 
portrayal of what is because they will be out of sync with reality. It is obvious 
why this is an undesirable end. 
Literacy is not usually seen this way as a bully. Literacy is usually seen as 
the answer to our problems, the key to future success in the job market, the 
doorway to a life of rational thought based on the acquisition of knowledge. 
However, blanket endorsement of the literacy caravan is not to see how language 
works, how it analyzes reality in a particular way and functions by taking aware-
ness further and further away from the sun and the grass and the things at hand 
into the work of creating or adopting a linguistic model of the world. This would 
be harmless if people kept on returning their gaze to the things and people and 
animals around them to see whether or not their models were appropriate or 
helpful. It would not matter that people sometimes get carried away when they 
speak or write if every time you heard a new word or invented a new scheme you 
checked with the situation or people on the ground to find out if it fits. However, 
language does not require us to do that. Language carries us away into the huge 
simulacrum of the world we construct ourselves or borrow from others to help 
us navigate. This is why it is so easy for many of us to live in a totally intellectual 
world—because language does not force us to stay in touch with “things” or how 
we feel. It substitutes itself for what we can see and smell and hear and makes it 
possible for us to “forget” who we are and the place where we live. 
Perhaps more than anything else, it is the domination of school curricula 
by literacy that is responsible for the difficulties experiential and environmental 
educators have encountered getting their ideas accepted by the mainstream. 
When individual perception is undervalued, the “world” is a construct written 
by the teacher, documented in textbooks and tested for on exams. It is not the 
“big blooming buzzing confusion” unfolding inside and outside of schoolroom 
walls, or at least the connection is only tangential. We are interested in whether 
to call something a theatre or a playhouse, a dragonfly or a wasp, but the things 
themselves might as well disappear from the universe as far as we are concerned, 
because we are not looking at them or smelling them or touching them with our 
hands. We are only writing about them. Or reading. 
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Conclusion 
There are a few examples of public school teachers incorporating perceptual ac-
tivities into their lesson plans and watching test scores rise (Johnson and Rucks, 
2001; Rud and Beck, 2000; Byerly, 2001; www.microsociety.org). Despite evi-
dence of their value, however, most mainstream teachers are obliged to focus 
strictly on reading and writing. Even Expeditionary Learning schools whose 
“Criteria of Quality for Learning Expedition Projects” contain a welcome dose of 
character-building attributes, such as “strong work habits” “perseverance,” and 
“craftsmanship,” test their more robust curriculum against the standard of im-
proving academic achievement. In the present climate in the United States, it is 
difficult if not impossible to find a state-financed school that adheres to anything 
else. When governments measure schools by how well their students do on stan-
dardized tests, activities which do not support linguistic measurement are not 
likely to be used by educators whose own salaries are sometimes tied to test re-
sults (Nelson, 2001; McClay, 2002). Any attempts to focus on the individual per-
ception of real things or the having of physically challenging experiences are sup-
plemental to the main agenda, which is getting children literate; they could even 
be seen as interfering with the acquisition of critical skills. 
Outdoor educators seem to be adapting themselves to the new regime. 
Fearful that their body of knowledge and procedures will be used without refer-
ence to the process and foundations of experiential education, they no longer try 
to offer their programs within mainstream settings and see themselves as provid-
ing an effective, alternative structure outside regular schools, that is, charter 
schools. Since mainstream schools now focus mostly on reading skills, not indi-
vidual growth and development, it has been more useful to reconceive the goal 
of experiential education as the socialization of young people (Lindsay and 
Ewert, 1999, 18). The retrenchment may be wise under the circumstances. How-
ever, by abandoning the struggle to make mainstream education more “progres-
sive,” are they not capitulating to the further separation of our two forms of 
knowledge? 
My analysis of the power of language offers another way to conceive the 
problem. If the reason why mainstream education is still closed to experiential 
approaches to learning is because it is under the spell of the linguistic form of 
knowledge and we want to make mainstream learning more experiential, maybe 
we need to disenchant it from language. Maybe we need to expose the ways that 
language has got its teeth into our thinking and behavior such that we no longer 
try to help children see where they are and what they are doing. This effort may 
seem an unnecessary detour from the hard work of persuading schools to allow 
teachers to teach cooking for its own sake, not just for the sake of state standards, 
or to let students out of the classroom to visit a river. However, I would maintain 
that because of the grip language has over our consciousness, if we do not do it, 
the effects of our work are not going to be long-term. They are going to peter out 
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once children hit the big tests. It is not that I wish to replace the teaching of liter-
acy with experiential or environmental learning. Rather, the teaching of literacy 
needs to be more honest about what it is replacing and start helping children 
make the “connections” they need to understand what we want them to learn. 
William James said it long ago. We have two forms of knowledge, language 
and perception, and both are necessary to live and understand life. Perception 
puts us in touch with what is, the huge gorgeous show that all of us are part of 
and wash our hands in every day, while language inspires our wills with its ideal 
constructs and provides the map which shows us where to go to get what we 
want. By acknowledging only literacy in our schools we are giving children only 
half of the equation. We are giving them the map but we are not showing them 
how the map hooks onto the world—through perception. It should not surprise 
us that some students leave school feeling deprived and angry. Not only have 
they spent thirteen years listening to and reading someone else’s words, they 
have forgotten what things feel like, smell like, and taste like, because all they 
know are words, symbols, maps, charts. They have had the world stolen from 
them. 
The situation is baffling, to say the least. We must teach children how to 
read so that they can survive in our language-drenched civilization. On the other 
hand, we must also show them how not to read so that they can use their senses 
to see and experience where they are. Perhaps a self-aware literacy program 
would pick up on the precedent set by Denver’s Rocky Mountain School of Ex-
peditionary Learning, and supplement work teaching children how to read and 
write well with plenty of attention to concrete things and experiences so that 
they become familiar with the difference between representation and reality. As 
students become accustomed to spending equal amounts of time observing 
where they are and writing or reading about it, teachers could talk to them about 
the differences between the two and how important it is to check back with their 
observations to make certain they do not forget what they perceive. They could 
compare their perceptions and try to figure out why people see things differently. 
They could examine how what we perceive is affected by ideas, slogans, and im-
ages and what steps we could take to reduce their influence. They might even try 
to observe things for their own sake. Something like this is needed to counteract 
the pervasive influence of literacy’s children—journalism, advertising, TV, im-
ages—in students’ lives. We need to show them how to get some control over 
what language makes them do, because left unchecked, they are at risk of being 
hoodwinked by forces that do not have their best interests in mind. 
Though clearly an amazing tool, not all of language’s features are func-
tional, as it is now widely agreed that we are in the process of destroying the 
planet. Derek Bickerton’s call for a serious discussion about language and how it 
took our species out of unity with the rest of nature is long overdue (Bickerton, 
1991, 256–257). How to uncover what those dysfunctional features are and try to 
correct them is one of the motives behind the present essay. Such an uncovering 
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is particularly critical for teachers, because they enforce society’s values, and if 
they understood better why language is a problem, they might significantly in-
fluence the way that the next generation thinks (Thompson, 2004). 
Certainly, there will be insufficient impetus for change until more teachers 
realize that literacy cannot be the only thing we teach. If we are interested in 
helping students make sense of the world, at the very least we owe them the op-
portunity to study the world as an observable phenomenon. Chomsky says that 
nature provides us with an innate stock of concepts and the child’s task is to dis-
cover their labels (Chomsky, 2000, 65–66). However, nature also gives us the 
world and a physical body with which to explore it. The child’s task is to find out 
what’s “out there” and study its features. This is how humans have always 
learned, and it is the only way to reach deep understanding. “Percepts and con-
cepts interpenetrate and melt together, impregnate and fertilize each other. Nei-
ther, taken alone, knows reality in its completeness. We need them both, as we 
need both our legs to walk with” (James, 1977a, 235). 
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